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ABSTRACT 
 
The idea that systems have a property called ‘resilience’ has emerged in the last decade [1]. 
In this paper we intend to bring the idea of resilient systems for the hardware applied in 
safety-critical systems, such as the new nuclear reactor instrumentation and control (I&C) 
systems. The new systems (based in hardware description language (HDL) programmable 
devices) have been developed in response to the obsolescence of old analog technologies and 
current microprocessor-based digital technologies. Although HDL programmable devices 
have been widely used in various other industries for decades, they are still very new in 
nuclear reactors systems, which can be seen as a challenge and risk in the safety analyses and 
licensing efforts for utilities and designers. The goal of this work is to develop and test 
hardware architectures to tolerate the occurrence of faults, including multiple faults, 
minimizing the impact of the recovery process on system availability. Basic concepts of 
resilience in complex systems, as “return to equilibrium”, “robustness” and “extra adaptive 
capacity” were analyzed from the point of view of hardware architectures, leading to linkages 
between concepts and methods for resilience using an approach that increases reliability and 
simplifies the licensing process of systems based in HDL programmable devices in nuclear 
plants.  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Circumventing risks posed to life, property and environment, of which one depends on, has 
always been a matter of concern for human beings, already since the times when nature was 
the only source of threats. Technologies developed throughout history have been deeply 
helpful to decrease natural hazards and they have brought major upsides for humanity in 
several areas. Nonetheless, those very same technologies, which have already set the path for 
such a wide array of achievements, also have threats associated with its application. 
Therefore, the control and supervision systems which have been developed by focusing on 
several applications, must also take into account the protection aspect of it and decrease the 
level of risk that any given activity may pose. This is particularly important for a whole class 
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of applications called Safety-Critical Applications, in which issues within the controlled 
processes are considered to be a risk to the human being, to properties and to the 
environment.   
 
A vast set of applications fit the criterion of a critical classification in terms of safety. 
Applications which deal with nuclear radiation, such as nuclear power plants, are a proper 
example of such, as well as chemical industry plants, medical equipment for the monitoring 
and treatment of patients, passenger transport systems and space and military endeavours.   
 
The number of applications which happen to be classified as critical have a tendency to 
escalate, taking into consideration the increase in the number of systems which are 
automatically controlled by relying on digital processing and also the negative consequences 
of failures which take place in these systems. The control and supervision systems for these 
applications are, in its vast majority, based on programmable processors, such as 
programmable logic controllers (PLCs), microcontrollers or even PCs for general use. Along 
with these complex hardware elements we find the software, which grants these same 
systems with a major flexibility to perform in countless applications. 
 
The goal of this work is focused on how one can establish hardware architectures to integrate 
the most recent programmable logic devices (FPGA) in systems that can be used during 
critical applications, suiting the requirements of standards, such as the instrumentation for 
nuclear reactors, and granting the already developed architectures with a degree of reliability 
and fault tolerance based on the concept of resilience in hardware-based systems. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the need to use 
programmable devices, such as FPGA, in new Safety-Critical Systems. In Section 3 we 
introduce the concept of hardware resilience. Then, in Section 4, we present hardware 
architectures simulated in Labview graphical environment. Last, in Section 5, we draw some 
conclusions and point out some directions for future work. 
 
 
2. FPGA-BASED SYSTEMS IN SAFETY-CRITICAL APPICATIONS 
 
The flexibility found in processor and software-based systems pose a major challenge for 
critical applications, as the complexity involved in guaranteeing that these systems keep their 
reliability is something massive. A reliable system must be endowed with the ability to 
provide its functions as previously specified, with availability (in other words, having its 
functions active whenever they are requested), with safety (in other words, without failures) 
and with a protection against intrusion.  
 
Developing architectures for critical systems closer to hardware, with less reliance on 
processors, software and often operating systems, has proven to be a good choice for the 
development of reliable systems in new projects [2] [3]. Some upsides associated with this 
choice are related to an easier verification and validation procedure, concerning the 
architectures that are closer to the hardware, a much more streamlined way to promote the 
diversity of technology at critical systems which require redundancy, aside from ensuring a 
cost reduction when a comparison is established with those prompted by a quick 
obsolescence of systems with processors and software.  
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The hardware which happens to be deployed in control systems permeates a broad spectrum 
of digital services, which range from the general purpose processor to the application-specific 
integrated circuits, the ASICs. Among the processors, supplied with highly flexible functions 
by software, and the ASICs, with great performance, but lacking any sort of functional 
flexibility (they cannot be reprogrammed after having been manufactured), one can find 
several architectures of programmable logic devices (PLDs) which provide the advantages 
related to being closer to the hardware and allow their own reprogramming.  
 
The PLDs are part of a family comprised of programmable devices using the hardware 
description language (HDL), large-scale integrated circuits in which the internal hardware 
leaves the factory without having any function previously set, being totally configured 
according to the need of the final application for which it is intended to. 
  
The most renowned among the devices of this family are the FPGA (Field-Programmable 
Gate Array), which have registered a tremendous evolution in recent years in order to be 
capable of providing architectures with top-notch performance and a big functional capacity. 
Figure 1 shows designs options for digital systems. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Design options for digital systems. 
 
2.1. The choice for FPGA devices 
 
The pursuit of increasing the reliability in systems for critical applications is something 
permanent, being regarded as a matter of concern by designers of several fields, such as the 
instrumentation for nuclear reactors, chemical industries, air and land-based transport, space 
missions, banking systems and communication networks in general, among several others. 
This concern is augmented when a new device technology becomes part of the options 
available to carry out those systems, as it happens with programmable logic devices such as 
the FPGA.  
 
An array of factors prompts the industry to rely on FPGA for control and monitoring systems 
in brand new projects, which include critical systems. The FPGA devices may embody a 
simpler and easier to verify the hardware architecture, one that happens to be less expensive 
than processor-based systems. Aside from this, they are less vulnerable to obsolescence, 
taking into account the possibility of portability of the hardware, described among different 
manufacturers.  
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The route towards a wider use of the FPGA poses a challenge for the research conducted in 
hardware architecture modelling, which ensures the reliability of the critical system, 
particularly in what concerns fault tolerance issues in the hardware developed. Some works 
present ways to mitigate failures in hardware by using redundancy [4][5], which is the most 
common passive method, in addition to active methods such as the replacement of resources 
allocated in advance [6], or a dynamic recovery [7], in which the replacement of hardware 
resources is deployed right from the moment when the failure is detected.  
 
Given the progresses in component technology, there has been an increase in the capacity and 
performance of the FPGA, which also includes internal processors that constitute the 
Systems-on-Chip (SoCs) within the device itself, demanding a team of experts in software 
and hardware (digital integrated circuits), more wide-ranging than the one which usually 
constitutes a prerequisite for processor-based systems, as well as brand new methods to keep 
the fault tolerance within an appropriate range for critical applications in hardware. 
 
Safety-critical applications, such as the instrumentation of nuclear reactors, are endowed with 
deeply recent rules and guidelines, related specifically to the use of FPGA devices [8], thus 
posing a brand new challenge for designers related to the licensing issues of systems that 
happen to be developed with this technology. Adopting a more recent technology constitutes 
a problem for the development teams of critical systems, particularly for applications of this 
kind, as they are still lacking a vast operating experience or a significant set of data capable 
of being presented to the regulatory bodies. 
 
 
3. HARDWARE RESILIENCE CONCEPTS 
 
In computer systems, resilience has been defined as the persistence of reliability when it has 
to cope with changes [9]. A concept that happens to be more comprehensive than the fault 
tolerance mechanism, which is effective when the fault is within its own spectrum of 
effectiveness. Abiding by this context, in order to be resilient, the software must have, 
beforehand, reliability, an attribute that has to be kept even when facing changes in the 
system’s disruption. 
 
In order to keep the reliability of critical systems, whilst accommodating the strict standards 
and relying on the most recent devices, even when facing the everlasting additions of features 
in these SoCs, this work approaches an extension to the reliability and fault tolerance issue, 
based on the concept of resilience in hardware-based systems. 
 
In this section we will examine basic concepts of resilience applied to hardware, indicating 
architectures that can satisfy these concepts. 
 
3.1. Resilience and Robustness 
 
Some of the earliest explorations of resilience confounded these two labels, and this confound 
continues to add noise to work on resilience [10]. Robustness is linked to increased ability to 
absorb disturbances. But, as verified by Alderson and Doyle [11], robustness is always of the 
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form: System X has property Y that is robust in sense Z to perturbation W. In other words, 
robust control works, and only works, for cases where the disturbances are well-modeled. 
 
In hardware, robustness can be seen as redundancy. Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) has 
become the most common practice because of its straightforward implementation and reliable 
results. The TMR fault mitigation scheme uses three identical logic circuits performing the 
same task in parallel with corresponding outputs being compared through majority voters [4]. 
TMR implementations in FPGA have the drawback that a fault may affect more than one 
module and cause the crash of the system. TMR is capable to mask any faults affecting the 
output of only one replica at any time. Figure 2 shows a triple-redundant module with a 
single voter at the output. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  First approach - TMR. 
 
3.2. Resilience and Return to Equilibrium 
 
Wood [1] conceptualizes that return to equilibrium, or rebound, considers responses to 
specific disruptions, but much more importantly the disrupting events represent surprises, that 
is, the event is a surprise when it falls outside the scope of variations and disturbances that the 
system in question is capable of handling. 
 
There are techniques, like Scrubbing, available in some FPGA devices, to make the hardware 
return to equilibrium from a faulty state in its configuration memory. Configuration memory 
is the largest FPGA memory element and is used to store the user design [12]. Numerous 
approaches can be taken with respect to scrubbing, from simply reprogramming the FPGA to 
partial reconfiguration. These techniques are heavily dependent on the tools of the FPGA 
manufacturers, which can be inconvenient for critical applications. 
 
For transient faults, a way to achieve a return to equilibrium in hardware is to use temporal 
redundancy. For this it is necessary to identify a failed module and repeat the execution. 
If the fault is transient, repeating the execution will make it disappear. Comparators should be 
used in conjunction with, at least, two redundant modules to be able to identify a failed 
module. Figure 3 shows this approach. It is necessary to use registers so that the output does 
not pass a wrong value to the next stage while comparing the value of the redundant outputs. 
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Figure 3:  Second approach – redundancy with comparison. 
 
3.3. Resilience and “Extra Adaptive Capacity” 
 
The idea of a system that extends performance, or brings an extra adaptive capacity to 
withstand failures when surprise events challenge its limits [1], it’s a motivating factor of 
many researches. When applied to hardware, it brings us closer to the idea of self-healing 
hardware.  
 
Thinking about the hardware we are trying to preserve from failures in the two previous 
examples, a surprise event that challenges its limits would be when a failure occurs in two 
redundant modules and become permanent. The hardware architecture to mitigate faults of 
this type would have to use the techniques previously presented to mask (TMR) and detect 
(comparison) the faulted module, replacing this faulting module with a spare module (or 
reconfiguring the module) before a second module fails. 
 
Figure 4 shows this approach. It is necessary to include a circuit (state machine) that checks 
the results of the comparators and identifies the module with error. In this operation, the first 
fault detected is considered as a transient and so proper output is selected. A second, repeated 
error in the same location is acknowledged as permanent.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4:  Third approach – TMR and comparison 
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4. SIMULATION OF HARDWARE ARCHITECTURES IN LABVIEW 
 
The circuit showed at Figure 5 was selected as the module where it is intended to mitigate 
faults using the approaches described in Section 3. This simple combinational circuit 
represents one of the possible logics of shutdown (TRIP) belonging to a reactor protection 
system.  
Figure 5:  Design selected for digital systems. 
 
FPGA resources are all vulnerable to radiation-induced upsets. SEU (Single Event Upset)  
can be defined as a radiation-induced upset that causes the state of a memory cell to change, 
from 1 to 0 or from 0 to 1. This is also informally known as a bit-flip. SETs (Single Event 
Transient) are transient glitches on transmission lines or in combinatorial logic. Depending on 
the duration and amplitude of these glitches, they may lead to errors. SEUs and SETs are 
unpredictable and random by nature [13]. 
 
Using functions in Labview, the failure injection in the module is simulated by randomly 
changing the value of the bit in its output. These changes are transient, simulating SEU or 
SET. It was also randomly maintained by one or two processing cycles to simulate multiple 
errors in the same module. The injection of a fault is done in the same module and at the 
same time in all three hardware architectures. Permanent changes, simulating a permanent 
hardware failure, will be evaluated later. 
 
 
Table 1:  Simulation results. 
 
 First approach Second approach Third approach 
Number of 
injected faults 17963 12041 17963 
Output changed 85 214 78 
Percentage 0,473% 1,77726% 0,434% 
 
 
Table 1 shows a summary of the simulation results. After some time running the program it is 
possible to verify several failure events and the amount of those that was mitigated in the 
architectures. As expected, the third approach, which masks and detects the failed module, 
has proved more resilient to mitigate failures. However, the improvement is not so significant 
in relation to the first approach, TMR only. The great advantage of this approach will be to 
mitigate permanents failures in a module. This approach obviously will cause area overhead 
in the FPGA. 
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The changes in the output are caused by failures in two modules at the same time, which is 
not expected for the architectures to mitigate. Parts of a system which are capable of causing 
a failure for the whole system, called single points of failure, as the voter, were not 
considered in this study. These should also have redundancy to minimize single point of 
failure. 
 
4.1. Permanent Hardware Failures 
 
Only the architecture of the third approach (fig. 4) has the possibility of mitigating permanent 
failure occurred in a module by replacing it with a spare, thus maintaining the same triple 
redundancy. Maintaining hardware performance even with boundary-defying changes is one 
of the important characteristics when thinking about resilient systems. The resilient capacity 
of the system can still be high if we use techniques of reconfiguration of the module, such as 
scrubbing, in addition to the spare module. 
 
 
3. CONCLUSIONS  
 
This work presented the proposal of hardware architecture models which can integrate the 
features of new FPGA devices on systems that may be used in critical applications, as nuclear 
reactor protection system, adding an adaptive dimension to the concept of fault tolerance in 
hardware, described as resilience in hardware.  
 
The simulations have shown that these hardware architectures work efficiently to mitigate 
module failures, allowing subsequent studies to use these approaches to assess the resilience 
of critical systems using FPGA, evaluating benefits in relation to the occupied area overhead 
in these devices. 
 
Some studies are of the opinion that hardware-based systems, without an operating system, 
will keep increasing their influence in critical applications. The continuation of this work will 
contribute to enabling the adoption of new FPGA devices by hardware development teams 
for critical systems, as nuclear instrumentation reactors, benefitting the issues related to the 
licensing of these systems with regulatory bodies. 
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